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Abstract 
In this paper, we present data on trends over time in domestic saving rates in twelve economies in 
developing Asia during the 1966-2007 period and analyze the determinants of these trends.  We 
find that domestic saving rates in developing Asia have, in general, been high and rising but that 
there have been substantial differences from economy to economy and that the main determinants 
of these trends appear to have been the age structure of the population (especially the aged 
dependency ratio), income levels, and the level of financial sector development.  We then project 
future trends in domestic saving rates in developing Asia for the 2011-2030 period based on our 
estimation results and find that the domestic saving rate in developing Asia as a whole will remain 
roughly constant during the next two decades despite rapid population aging in some economies in 
developing Asia because population aging will occur much later in other economies and because the 
negative impact of population aging on the domestic saving rate will be largely offset by the 
positive impact of higher income levels. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Developing Asia has been characterized by high domestic and national saving rates almost across 
the board in recent years, and these high saving rates have made possible high levels of domestic 
investment but have also led to large capital outflows (current account surpluses) (see, for example, 
the data presented in Park and Shin (2009)).  To put it another way, the developing economies of 
Asia have oversaved and underinvested, leading to large current account imbalances (surpluses), 
as asserted by Bernanke (2005) and others. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to present data on trends over time in domestic saving rates in twelve 
economies in developing Asia during the 1966-2007 period, to analyze the determinants of those 
trends, and to project trends in domestic saving rates in these same economies during the next 
twenty years (2011-2030 period) based on the estimation results.  The twelve economies included 
in our analysis are the People’s Republic of China (PRC); Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; 
Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea); Malaysia; Pakistan; Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; 
Thailand, and Viet Nam, which comprise 95 percent of the GDP of developing Asia.  This paper 
contributes to the literature in several respects.  First, it presents and compares data on both 
nominal and real domestic saving rates, even though few past studies have looked at real rates 
despite their importance.  Second, it examines the nonlinear impact of financial sector 
development on the saving rate, which is particularly relevant for our sample of countries.  Finally, 
it generates long-term projections based on the estimation results. 
 
This paper is organized as follows:  In section 2, we present our estimation model of the 
determinants of domestic saving rates; in section 3, we discuss past trends in domestic saving rates 
and in the determinants thereof in developing Asia; in section 4, we present our empirical results 
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concerning the determinants of domestic saving rates in developing Asia; in section 5, we discuss 
our future projections of domestic saving rates in developing Asia; and section 6 concludes. 
 
To summarize the main findings of this paper, we find that domestic saving rates in developing 
Asia have, in general, been high and rising but that there have been substantial differences from 
economy to economy, that the main determinants of the domestic saving rate in developing Asia 
during the 1960-2007 period appear to have been the age structure of the population (especially the 
aged dependency ratio), income levels, and the level of financial sector development, and moreover, 
that the direction of impact of each factor has been more or less as expected.  We also find that the 
domestic saving rate in developing Asia as a whole will remain roughly constant during the next 
two decades because the negative impact of population aging thereon will be roughly offset by the 
positive impact of higher income levels thereon but that there will be substantial variation from 
economy to economy, with the rapidly aging economies showing a sharp downturn in their domestic 
saving rates by 2030 because the negative impact of population aging thereon will dominate the 
positive impact of higher income levels thereon and the less rapidly aging economies showing rising 
domestic saving rates, at least until 2020, because the positive impact of higher income levels 
thereon will dominate the negative impact of population aging thereon.  
 
2. Estimation Model of the Determinants of Domestic Saving Rates 
 
In this section, we discuss the estimation model we will use in our econometric analysis of the 
determinants of domestic saving rates in developing Asia.  There have been many previous 
empirical analyses of the determinants of saving rates using cross-section or panel cross-country 
data or time series data for individual countries, among them Modigliani (1970), Feldstein (1977, 
1980), Modigliani and Sterling (1983), Horioka (1989), Edwards (1996), Dayal-Ghulati and 
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Thimann (1997), Bailliu and Reisen (1998), Higgins (1998), Loayza, et al. (2000), Chinn and Prasad 
(2003), Luhrman (2003), International Monetary Fund (2005), Bosworth and Chodorow-Reich 
(2007), Kim and Lee (2008), Park and Shin (2009), Horioka and Yin (2010), and Hung and Qian 
(2010), and a smaller number of studies that conduct similar analyses of the determinants of 
current account balances, among them Chinn and Ito (2007, 2008) and Ito and Chinn (2009).  The 
present study is based most closely on Higgins (1998), Bosworth and Chodorow-Reich (2007), and 
Park and Shin (2009). 
 
These studies suggest an important role for demographic variables based on the life cycle model.  
Looking first at the impact of the age structure of the population, since the aged typically finance 
their living expenses by drawing down their previously accumulated savings, the aged dependency 
ratio (the ratio of the aged population to the working-age population) should have a negative 
impact on the saving rate, and similarly, since children typically consume without earning income, 
the youth dependency ratio (the ratio of children to the working-age population) should also have a 
negative impact on the saving rate.  Moreover, a higher youth dependency ratio means more 
children to provide care and financial assistance during old age and less need to save on one’s own 
for old age, and hence the youth dependency ratio could have a negative impact on the saving rate 
for this reason as well.  Park and Shin (2009) and most other studies find that the aged 
dependency ratio and the youth dependency ratio both decrease the saving rate, as expected.  
 
A high growth rate of real GDP is another important factor, creating a virtuous cycle in which rapid 
income growth makes it easy to save, and high saving feeds back through capital accumulation to 
promote further growth.  Bosworth and Chodorow-Reich (2007) as well as Park and Shin (2009) 
find that both contemporaneous and lagged real per capita GDP growth rates increase the saving 
rate.  Moreover, Park and Shin (2009) also find that the level of per capita income has a significant 
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nonlinear or more precisely convex relationship with the saving rate in Asia, but Bosworth and 
Chodorow-Reich (2007) do not find a significant effect. 
 
Aside from demographic and GDP-related variables, financial sector development is also 
considered to be a crucial determinant of saving rates, but the direction of its impact is ambiguous 
theoretically as well as empirically.  Wang, Xu, and Xu’s (2011) theoretical analysis of the impact 
of financial sector development on the saving rate finds that, if both households and firms are 
subject to financial friction and if the financial sector development occurs first in the corporate 
sector and then spreads to the household sector (a likely scenario), then financial sector 
development will have a hump-shaped impact on the saving rate, initially increasing the saving 
rate by increasing firms’ ability to borrow and invest but then reducing the saving rate by 
weakening the precautionary saving incentives of households.  Turning to empirical studies, 
Loayza, et al. (2000) as well as Horioka and Yin (2010) find that financial sector development has a 
negative impact on the saving rate, Park and Shin (2009) find that its impact is insignificant, and 
Wang, Xu, and Xu (2011) find a hump-shaped relationship.  By contrast, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that relaxing financial constraints by increasing the availability of saving instruments 
and accessibility to banks may promote higher saving, as argued by Chinn and Prasad (2003) and 
Jha, et al. (2009).  Thus, both the theoretical and empirical literature suggests the possibility of a 
nonlinear relationship between financial sector development and the saving rate, and this paper 
investigates this possibility. 
 
Finally, the real interest rate should, in theory, have an impact on the saving rate although the 
direction of its impact is theoretically ambiguous. 
 
Thus, the reduced form estimating equation we will estimate is as follows: 
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where i = 1, … 12 (1 = PRC, 2 = Hong Kong, China, 3 = Indonesia, 4 = India, 5 = Korea, 6 = 
Malaysia, 7 = Pakistan, 8 = Philippines, 9 = Singapore, 10 = Thailand, 11 = Taipei,China, and 12 = 
Viet Nam); and t = 1, … 8 (1 = 1966-70, 2 = 1971-75, 3 = 1976-80, 4 = 1981-85, 5 = 1986-1990, 6 = 
1991-1995, 7 = 1996-2000, and 8 = 2001-2007). 
 
tiSR ,  represents the real domestic saving rate in country i at time t; tiAGE ,  is the aged 
dependency ratio (the ratio of the population aged 65 or older to the population aged 15-64); tiDEP ,  
is a youth dependency ratio (the ratio of the population aged 14 or younger to the population aged 
15-64); tiLNGDP ,  is the log of per capita real GDP; tiLNGDPSQ , is the square of tiLNGDP , , 
tiCREDIT ,  is the ratio of private credit from deposit money banks and other financial institutions 
to GDP; tiCREDITSQ , is the square of tiCREDIT , , and tiX ,  is a vector of the other explanatory 
variables included in the estimation model.  i,0β  is a constant plus country fixed effects when a 
fixed effects model is estimated.  In addition, in some variants, we include tiCHGDP , , the growth 
rate of real per capita GDP and/or tiRINT , , the real interest rate. 
 
In addition, we also try using one-period lags of variables relating to tiLNGDP , , tiCREDIT , , and 
tiCHGDP , in lieu of contemporaneous values because these variables are endogenous and thus 
using lagged values thereof would alleviate simultaneity bias.  
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3. Past Trends in Domestic Saving Rates in Developing Asia 
 
In this section, we discuss past trends in the domestic saving rate and in the determinants thereof 
in the twelve developing Asian economies in our sample.  First, in Table 1 and Figure 1, we 
present data on past trends in both the nominal as well as real domestic saving rates for each of the 
twelve developing Asian economies in our sample as well as for these twelve countries as a whole 
(weighted by real GDP) for each five-year subperiod during the 1966-2001 and for the most recent 
period, which includes the years from 2001 to 2007.   
 
Nominal domestic saving rates are computed as the ratio of gross domestic saving in current local 
currency units to gross domestic product in current local currency units and are taken from the 
World Development Indicators of the World Bank, while real domestic saving rates are computed 
by subtracting the consumption and government shares of real GDP from 1 and are taken from the 
Penn World Table, version 6.3 (Heston, et al. (2009)).  The nominal and real measures can show 
divergent trends if trends in GDP and capital goods deflators differ significantly.  
 
As can be seen from this table and figure, there is enormous variation among the twelve economies 
in the sample in their domestic saving rates, with the nominal domestic saving rate ranging from 
39.8 percent in Singapore (and also above 30 percent in the PRC, Malaysia, and Hong Kong, China) 
to 11.2 percent in Pakistan (and also below 20 percent in Viet Nam and the Philippines) during the 
1966-2007 period as a whole.  In fact, Viet Nam showed negative real domestic saving rates until 
she transitioned to a market economy in the 1990s.  Korea, Taipei,China, Thailand, Indonesia, 
and India showed intermediate nominal domestic saving rates during this period.  Nonetheless, 
domestic saving rates were relatively high in developing Asia as a whole relative to the rest of the 
world throughout the 1966-2007 period. 
7 
 
Nominal measure
1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-07 Average
PRC 28.9 29.1 33.0 34.8 37.0 41.9 40.7 46.2 37.8
Hong Kong, China 28.2 29.4 33.5 31.6 36.0 32.6 30.4 31.5 31.6
Indonesia 14.3 23.9 30.8 30.1 31.9 32.4 28.1 29.9 27.8
India 15.5 16.7 18.7 19.4 21.9 23.0 22.4 29.0 22.2
Korea, Rep. of 15.2 19.0 27.0 27.8 36.5 36.4 35.6 31.8 28.8
Malaysia 24.3 24.2 31.1 28.1 33.3 37.8 45.8 42.6 33.4
Pakistan 8.9 8.0 7.9 7.2 10.3 16.4 14.9 16.1 11.2
Philippines 21.9 23.6 26.2 21.0 19.0 16.3 17.1 13.8 19.1
Singapore 18.4 26.3 34.9 43.8 41.0 47.3 49.9 46.3 39.8
Thailand 21.2 22.8 22.1 24.3 30.8 35.8 34.3 32.2 27.9
Taipei,China 25.3 30.4 33.0 31.6 33.4 27.2 26.0 26.0 28.7
Viet Nam 3.9 14.6 22.2 29.0 17.4
Average 1/ 19.8 22.0 25.7 26.6 30.0 33.2 32.9 37.5
Note: Computed as Gross domestic savings (current LCU) / GDP (current LCU)
1/ weighted by average real GDP of each period
Real measure
1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85 1986-90 1991-95 1996-2000 2001-07 Average
PRC 27.3 28.3 30.1 28.1 27.0 27.7 29.4 35.6 29.2
Hong Kong, China 35.0 34.6 35.7 33.0 33.1 28.2 27.9 33.7 32.6
Indonesia 35.7 39.3 35.2 20.7 26.0 25.8 21.0 19.4 27.9
India 12.2 13.1 14.5 12.0 12.1 12.4 10.9 16.4 13.0
Korea, Rep. of 18.8 21.9 31.8 33.4 39.3 42.2 42.4 43.7 34.2
Malaysia 28.5 31.0 31.5 29.7 37.5 39.0 46.0 42.5 35.7
Pakistan 3.8 3.4 -3.8 -0.8 4.8 5.9 5.2 7.7 3.3
Philippines 10.2 13.2 18.1 18.9 14.2 10.6 9.7 10.8 13.2
Singapore 35.8 40.4 45.4 53.7 51.3 56.2 60.2 56.4 49.9
Thailand 17.9 21.0 21.7 24.8 30.4 35.2 32.8 31.7 26.9
Taipei,China 13.4 18.4 23.1 25.1 25.5 21.7 22.6 26.4 22.0
Viet Nam -2.4 -2.4 -2.4 -2.4 -1.7 6.9 12.6 16.8 3.1
Average 1/ 18.8 21.0 23.0 21.2 22.8 24.3 24.8 29.4
1/ weighted by average real GDP of each period
Table 1: Trends over Time in Gross Domestic Saving Rates in Developing Asia
Data source: Penn World Tables (PWT), version 6.3
Note: Computed as 100 - kc - kg, where "kc" is the consumption share of real GDP per capita and "kg" is the government
share of real GDP per capita.
Data source: World Bank, World Development Indicators
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Figure 1:  Trends over Time in Gross Domestic Saving Rates in Developing Asia 
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Data sources:  See Table 1. 
 
The real domestic saving rate ranged from 49.9 percent in Singapore (and also above 30 percent in 
Malaysia, Korea, and Hong Kong, China) to 3.1 percent in Viet Nam (and also below 20 percent in 
Pakistan, India, and the Philippines) during the 1966-2007 period as a whole.  The PRC, 
Indonesia, Thailand, and Taipei,China showed intermediate real domestic saving rates during this 
period.  Thus, the ranking ordering of the twelve countries is roughly the same regardless of 
whether we look at nominal or real domestic saving rates, with the biggest difference being that 
PRC falls from second to fifth when real domestic saving rates are used. 
 
Turning to trends over time, both the nominal and real domestic saving rates showed upward 
trends throughout the 1966-2007 period for the twelve developing Asian economies as a whole, 
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increasing from 19.8 (18.8) percent in 1966-70 to 37.5 (29.4) percent in 2001-07 in the case of the 
nominal (real) domestic saving rate.  Overall, the real saving rate tends to be higher than the 
nominal measure in higher per capita income economies such as Singapore and Korea, and the 
opposite holds in lower per capita income economies such as Pakistan, Viet Nam, India, and PRC.  
This is consistent with the notion that capital goods prices will tend to fall or grow more slowly 
than the GDP deflator as technological progress occurs and the economy grows.  
 
Moreover, the nominal and real domestic saving rates of most individual economies also showed 
upward trends during most or all of the 1966-2007 period, with the primary exceptions being that 
the nominal and real domestic saving rates of the Philippines, the nominal domestic saving rates of 
Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; the Republic of Korea; and Taipei,China, and the real domestic 
saving rate of Thailand have started declining in recent years, that the real domestic saving rate of 
Indonesia has been declining throughout the 1966-2007 period, and that the real domestic saving 
rates of Hong Kong, China, and Pakistan declined in the early years of the 1966-2007 period before 
turning upward.  
 
Given that the rank ordering of countries and trends over time are broadly similar regardless of 
whether we use nominal or real domestic saving rates, given that using a real measure is 
preferable from a theoretical point of view, and given that a number of authors (such as Aghion, 
Comin, Howitt, and Tecu (2009) and Shioji and Vu (2011)) have used a real measure of saving, we 
decided to use the real domestic saving rate as our dependent variable throughout our regression 
analysis.  Note, however, that we also tried using the nominal domestic saving rate and that the 
results were qualitatively very similar (with the main difference being that the coefficient of the 
AGE variable (to be defined later) is higher in absolute magnitude when the nominal domestic 
saving rate is used than when the real domestic saving rate is used. 
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Various factors affected the trends in domestic saving rates described above.  First of all, many of 
the economies in our sample experienced rapid demographic transition.  Life expectancy rose 
sharply from an average of about 53 in the early 1960s to 73 in the late 2000s in the sample as a 
whole.  Consequently, the aged dependency rate also increased (from 6.5 to 10.2 percent on 
average) during the same period.  Population aging has been particularly significant in Hong 
Kong, China; Korea; Singapore; and Taipei,China.  Meanwhile, the aged dependency rate has been 
declining somewhat in Pakistan and Viet Nam.  The youth dependency rate shows a uniform 
picture, declining in all of the economies in our sample, though to a lesser extent in Pakistan.  
 
Financial sector development played an especially significant role in developing Asia.  James, et al. 
(1989) discuss the role played by financial incentives such as raising interest rates on time and 
saving deposits in increasing the domestic saving rate when the financial system was still shallow 
in the 1970s (in Korea and Singapore, for example).  Financial deepening accelerated in many 
Asian economies after the mid-1980s, driven by financial liberalization, which relaxed financial 
constraints and eased access to credit.  However, these earlier forms of financial deepening tend to 
be more relevant for the corporate sector, as often discussed in the context of the financial 
development and growth nexus (see King and Levine, 1993, for example), and thus they 
presumably had a positive impact on the saving rate as firms’ investments become more profitable 
and the increasing demand for credit pushed up interest rates.  By contrast, improved access to 
credit by households and the resultant decline in precautionary saving tend to occur at a later stage 
of development, and thus the negative impact of financial sector development on saving rates will 
presumably tend to come later.  The developing Asian economies in our sample recorded 
deepening of their credit markets to more than 100% of GDP by the 2000s except in India, 
Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Viet Nam, and thus further financial deepening can be 
11 
 
expected to contribute toward reducing their saving rates, unlike in the case of earlier financial 
incentives and/or the relaxation of financial constraints.  
 
Moreover, these demographic and financial developments were accompanied by the continuing but 
uneven increase in per capita GDP and its growth rate. 
 
4.  Estimation Results concerning the Determinants of Domestic Saving Rates in Developing Asia 
 
In this section, we present our estimation results concerning the determinants of domestic saving 
rates in the twelve developing Asian economies in our sample during the 1966-2007 period.   
 
We estimated both a country fixed effects model and a random effects model with robust standard 
errors, and we use non-overlapping five-year averages except for the most recent period which 
includes the years from 2001 to 2007 in order to eliminate the impact of cyclical fluctuations and to 
focus on long-term rather than short-term variations.  Thus, we have maximum of 8 observations 
per country and a maximum of 78 total observations.   
 
Details concerning the variables used in our analysis (including data sources) can be found in 
Appendix Table 1, and descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix Table 2. 
 
Our estimation results are shown in Table 2.  Models 1-3 are country fixed effects models with no 
lags, models 4-6 are random effects models with no lags, models 7-9 are country fixed effects models 
with lags for tiLNGDP , , tiLNGDPSQ , , tiCREDIT , , tiCREDITSQ , , and tiCHGDP , , and models 
10-12 are random effects models with lags for these same variables. 
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While the results of standard specification tests such as the Hausman test and the Breusch and 
Pagan Lagrangian multiplier test suggest the use of random effects models, we show the results for 
both fixed effects and random effects models.  This is because a test of the joint significance of the 
country fixed effects rejected the null hypothesis that the coefficients of all of the country fixed 
effects are zero, because omitting country fixed effects seems to increase the residuals for some 
economies such as the PRC, as also argued by others including Hung and Qian (2010), and because 
we are interested in knowing whether there are significant country fixed effects when explaining 
domestic saving rates.   
 
As the results in Table 2 show, our results are intuitive and broadly consistent with those of 
previous studies.  Looking first at the results for the models without lags (models 1-6), the 
coefficient of AGE (the aged dependency ratio) is negative and significant, as expected, in every 
case, ranging from -0.83 to -0.98 in the country fixed effects model and from -1.58 to -1.69 in the 
random effects model.  Thus, the absolute magnitude of the coefficient of AGE is much larger in 
the random effects model than it is in the country fixed effects model and is, in fact, much larger in 
absolute magnitude than theoretical expectation (the life cycle model predicts that it should equal 
the negative of the ratio of working years to lifespan and thus should be well below one in absolute 
value).  This is presumably due to omitted variable bias arising from the omission of country fixed 
effects and other relevant variables.  The coefficient of DEP (the youth dependency ratio) is 
negative, as expected, in almost every case but is totally insignificant in all cases.  
 
Turning to the GDP-related variables, the coefficient of LNGDP (the log of real per capita GDP) is 
negative and significant, as expected, in all cases, with its square term being positive and 
significant in all cases, suggesting a nonlinear (convex) relationship with the domestic saving rate, 
as was also found by Park and Shin (2009).  In other words, income levels initially have a negative 
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Model AGE DEP LNGDP LNGDPSQ CREDIT CREDITSQ CHGDP RINT R-squared # obs.
1 -0.95 ** -0.03 -43.13 *** 2.92 *** 14.48 ** -6.46 *** 0.76 78
0.35 0.13 4.94 0.32 4.92 1.62 0.61
-2.71 -0.23 -8.73 9.24 2.94 -3.99 0.70
2 -0.98 ** -0.03 -44.21 *** 2.99 *** 14.58 ** -6.41 *** 0.08 0.76 78
0.38 0.13 6.19 0.39 5.01 1.70 0.14 0.62
-2.58 -0.22 -7.15 7.75 2.91 -3.78 0.59 0.71
3 -0.83 ** 0.05 -35.63 ** 2.53 *** 14.88 *** -6.25 *** 0.16 0.03 0.69 70
0.36 0.18 13.38 0.74 4.80 1.56 0.14 0.16 0.65
-2.28 0.27 -2.66 3.40 3.10 -4.00 1.15 0.19 0.72
4 -1.58 *** -0.08 -46.79 *** 3.15 *** 15.35 *** -6.71 *** 0.75 78
0.52 0.10 8.16 0.50 5.87 1.82 0.68
-3.03 -0.72 -5.73 6.29 2.61 -3.69 0.74
5 -1.63 *** -0.07 -49.45 *** 3.31 *** 15.08 ** -6.39 *** 0.24 * 0.75 78
0.54 0.10 8.97 0.55 5.92 1.83 0.13 0.70
-3.02 -0.69 -5.51 5.99 2.55 -3.49 1.75 0.75
6 -1.69 ** -0.62 -40.65 ** 2.85 *** 14.63 ** -6.15 *** 0.31 ** -0.04 0.66 70
0.66 0.15 16.77 1.01 6.23 1.84 0.15 0.19 0.75
-2.55 -0.41 -2.42 2.81 2.35 -3.35 2.09 -0.21 0.78
(continued)
Table 2: The Determinants of the Real Domestic Saving Rate in Developing Asia
Country fixed effects model with no lags
Random effects model with no lags
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Table 2 (continued)
Model AGE DEP LNGDP LNGDPSQ CREDIT CREDITSQ CHGDP RINT R-squared # obs.
7 -1.34 *** -0.02 -24.63 ** 1.96 *** 6.70 -3.51 0.60 66
0.40 0.20 8.40 0.47 6.22 2.13 0.59
-3.33 -0.09 -2.93 4.17 1.08 -1.65 0.66
8 -1.41 *** -0.02 -25.64 ** 2.03 *** 6.75 -3.32 0.19 0.60 66
0.46 0.20 8.86 0.52 6.45 2.24 0.15 0.62
-3.10 -0.09 -2.89 3.90 1.05 -1.48 1.28 0.68
9 -1.42 ** 0.09 -14.12 1.43 7.12 -2.98 0.26 * -0.07 0.55 62
0.51 0.23 16.90 0.86 5.70 1.95 0.14 0.26 0.57
-2.77 0.37 -0.84 1.66 1.25 -1.52 1.84 -0.27 0.64
10 -1.91 *** -0.14 -32.31 *** 2.39 *** 7.61 -4.09 0.58 66
0.61 0.13 10.43 0.73 7.40 2.52 0.70
-3.12 -1.08 -3.10 3.29 1.03 -1.62 0.73
11 -2.02 *** -0.14 -34.12 *** 2.51 *** 7.18 -3.51 0.40 ** 0.58 66
0.68 0.14 12.04 0.83 7.63 2.56 0.18 0.74
-2.99 -0.98 -2.83 3.03 0.94 -1.37 2.17 0.76
12 -1.93 *** -0.10 -23.92 1.97 * 5.02 -2.70 0.37 ** -0.17 0.52 62
0.72 0.16 18.59 1.16 7.37 2.40 0.17 0.24 0.73
-2.68 -0.61 -1.29 1.69 0.68 -1.13 2.22 -0.71 0.76
*Significant at the 10% level.  **Significant at the 5% level.  ***Significant at the 1% level.
Notes:  The figures are the estimated coefficients (first row), robust standard errors (second row), and t-values (third row).  The first R-squared is within, the
second is between, and the third is overall.  The constant terms and country fixed effects are not shown to save space.
Country fixed effects model with lags of LNGDP, LNGDPSQ, CREDIT, CREDITSQ, and CHGDP
Random effects model with lags of LNGDP, LNGDPSQ, CREDIT, CREDITSQ, and CHGDP
 
 15
impact on domestic saving rates but their impact becomes more and more positive as 
income levels rise.  Our results imply that, by 1976-80, income levels had become high 
enough for income levels to have a positive impact on domestic saving rates in nine out of 
the twelve economies in our sample, with income levels reaching this threshold by 1981-85 
in India, by 1986-90 in China, and by 1991-95 in Viet Nam.  Thus, by 1991-95, income 
levels had become high enough for income levels to have a positive impact on domestic 
saving rates in all twelve economies in our sample, as also found by Park and Shin (2009). 
 
Turning to the financial variables, the availability of private credit exhibits a nonlinear 
(concave) relationship with the domestic saving rate, with the coefficient of CREDIT (the 
ratio of private credit to GDP) being positive and significant and the coefficient of its 
squared term being negative and significant in all cases.  This nonlinear relationship 
indicates that financial sector development leads to a higher domestic saving rate up to a 
point, after which it works to lower the domestic saving rate, which is consistent with the 
theoretical model of Wang, Xu, and Xu (2011) and with the discussions in Chinn and 
Prasad (2003) and Jha, et al. (2009).  Our results imply that financial sector development 
has progressed enough in six of the twelve economies in our sample (PRC; Hong Kong, 
China; Korea; Malaysia; Singapore; and Taipei,China) for the availability of private credit 
to have a negative impact on the domestic saving rate in these economies but that 
financial sector development has not progressed enough in six of the twelve economies in 
our sample (India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, and Viet Nam) for the 
availability of private credit to have a negative impact on the domestic saving rate. 
 
Turning to the impact of CHGDP (the growth rate of real per capita GDP) and RINT (the 
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real interest rate), the coefficient of CHGDP is positive, as expected, in all cases and 
significant in two out of four cases, and the coefficient of RINT is not stable in sign and is 
totally insignificant.  This might be due to the often discussed fact that interest rates 
start to matter for saving behavior only after economic development has progressed 
beyond a certain threshold (see Ogaki, Ostry, and Reinhart, 1996). 
 
Turning to the results for the models with lags (models 7-12), the results are broadly 
consistent with the results for the models without lags:  the coefficient of AGE is negative, 
as expected, and significant in all cases, the coefficient of DEP is negative, as expected, but 
totally insignificant in all cases, the coefficients of LNGDP and LNGDPSQ are negative 
and positive, respectively, and are significant in most (but not all cases), the coefficient of 
CHGDP is positive, as expected, and significant in three out of four cases, and the 
coefficient of RINT is negative but totally insignificant. 
 
The biggest difference between the results for the models without lags and those for the 
models with lags is in the impact of financial sector development.  The significant impact 
of financial sector development found in models 1-6 without lags disappears in models 
7-12 with lags, which suggests the existence of simultaneity bias even though the signs of 
the relevant variables still indicate a concave impact of financial sector development on 
the domestic saving rate.  Another difference is that the absolute magnitudes of the 
coefficients of AGE and CHGDP are larger in the case of the models with lags whereas the 
absolute magnitudes of the coefficients of LNGDP, LNGDPSQ, CREDIT, and CREDITSQ 
are larger in the case of the models without lags, which suggests that the models without 
lags exaggerate the impact of LNGDP, LNGDPSQ, CREDIT, and CREDITSQ due to 
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simultaneity bias.   
 
Finally, the results of the fixed effects models show that the country fixed effects are 
significant for most economies (except for Korea, Malaysia, and Singapore) with a 
significant negative sign when the PRC is taken as the reference country, indicating a 
much higher domestic saving rate in the PRC than predicted by the other explanatory 
variables. 
 
As a robustness check, we also tried including time dummies for 7 out of the 8 time periods.  
When we did so, we found that the coefficients of 3 out of the 7 time dummies were 
significant at the 10 percent level (with the coefficients indicating a downward trend over 
time).  However, a test for the joint significance of the time dummies failed to reject the 
null hypothesis that the coefficients of all of the time dummies are zero at the 5 percent 
significance level in the case of the benchmark model, and the results for the other 
explanatory variables were roughly comparable to those for the model without time 
dummies (except that the absolute magnitude of the coefficient of AGE becomes larger and 
the absolute magnitude of the coefficients of CREDIT and its squared term become 
smaller).  Thus, we have not shown the results for the model that includes time dummies. 
 
In sum, the main determinants of the domestic saving rate in developing Asia during the 
1966-2007 period appear to be the age structure of the population (especially the aged 
dependency ratio), income levels, and (to a lesser extent) the level of financial sector 
development, except as noted above, and moreover, the direction of impact of each factor is 
more or less as expected.  
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5.  Projections of Domestic Saving Rates in Developing Asia for 2011-2030  
 
In this section, we discuss our projections of domestic saving rates in the twelve 
developing Asian economies in our sample for 2011-2030.  We should note at the start, 
however, that future projections over such a long time horizon are fraught with dangers 
and that we implicitly assume that there will be no changes in any factor (e.g., economic 
policies, institutions, etc.) other than those explicitly included in our analysis, which is not 
likely to be the case.  Thus, our results should be taken with a grain of salt. 
 
We show only the projections based on the fixed effects model because, while the results of 
standard specification tests such as the Hausman test and the Breusch and Pagan 
Lagrangian multiplier test suggest the use of random effects models, a test of the joint 
significance of the country fixed effects rejected the null hypothesis that the coefficients of 
all of the country fixed effects are zero, because the absolute magnitude of the coefficient of 
the aged dependency ratio seems unreasonably large in the estimation results based on 
the random effects model, as noted earlier, and because comparing out-of-sample 
projections based on the fixed effects and random effects models suggests that the random 
effects model does not perform as well as the fixed effects model in fitting the domestic 
saving rate for a number of economies such as the PRC, Korea, Singapore, Pakistan, and 
the Philippines.  The projections from the random effects models underestimate the 
saving rates of the former three economies while overestimating those of the latter two 
economies.  This is consistently true for all six random effects models.  For the PRC, 
omitting the country fixed effect would yield a saving rate of about 24% of GDP for the 
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2001-2007 period—10 percentage points lower than the actual rate.  Our finding is 
remarkably consistent with Hung and Qian’s (2010) finding that China’s national saving 
rate is about 10 to 12 percentage points higher than that predicted by their regression 
analysis.  A possible explanation for the case of the PRC is omitted factors such as the 
increase in the corporate saving rate during this period (IMF, 2009) and/or the distorted 
sex ratio of those of marrying age (Wei and Zhang, 2009).  Another example of an obvious 
deviation of the fitted saving rate from the actual rate is the Philippines, where the fitted 
saving rate based on the random effects model does not show the decline observed in the 
actual rate.  The rapidly increasing coverage of the social security system has been 
suggested as one of the explanations for why this might be (Terada-Hagiwara, 2009).   
 
Our projections for the next two decades, 2011-2020 and 2021-2030, rely on the United 
Nations’ (U.N.) projections of the age structure of the population (the aged and youth 
dependency ratios, median variant) and the GDP projections of Lee and Hong (2010).   
 
Since projections of financial sector development are not available, we assumed that 
financial deepening progresses according to the level of per capita income.  We projected 
in which World Bank income group each country would belong in 2011-2020 and 
2021-2030 using Lee and Hong's (2010) GDP projections and assigned to each country the 
2008 value of the financial sector development variable (private credit to GDP ratio) for 
the income group to which it is projected to belong in each time period except that, for 
economies in which the financial sector has already deepened beyond the average value for 
the income group to which they are projected to belong (Hong Kong, China; the PRC, 
Taipei,China, and Viet Nam in 2011-2020 and these same countries minus the PRC in 
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2021-2030), the financial sector development variable was assumed to remain at the same 
value as in the recent past (the average value for 2000-2007).   The average 2008 values 
of the financial sector development variable for each income group were 130% for the high 
income group, 105% for the upper middle income group, and 46% for the lower middle 
income group, as shown in Beck et al. (2008).  Hong Kong, China; Korea; Malaysia; 
Singapore; the PRC; and Taipei,China are projected to belong to the high income group, 
Thailand to the upper middle income group, and Indonesia, India, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, and Viet Nam to the lower middle income group by 2021-2030. 
 
Saving rate projections are generated for the 2011-2020 and 2021-2030 periods using the 
coefficients in model 7 of Table 2, the baseline country fixed effects model with lags, 
because simultaneity bias will presumably be less severe in the model with lags.  Table 3 
shows future projections of domestic saving rates for the twelve economies in our sample, 
and as can be seen from this table, domestic saving rates in Hong Kong, China; Indonesia; 
Korea; Malaysia; Philippines; Singapore; Thailand; and Taipei,China are expected to 
decrease (except for a slight upturn in Korea in 2021-30); that of Viet Nam is expected to 
increase in 2011-20, then decrease in 2021-30; that of the PRC is expected to remain 
roughly flat for the next two decades; and that of India and Pakistan are expected to 
increase (comparisons are being made to fitted values for the 2001-07 period).  
 
While all of the developing Asian economies in our sample are projected to post steady 
growth, which will lead to higher income levels, which in turn will create upward pressure 
on their domestic saving rates, the dramatic differences among these economies in 
projected future trends in their domestic saving rates are not surprising because there is a 
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40- to 50-year gap in the timing of population aging, as can be seen from Table 4.  As a 
result of these dramatic differences in the timing of the demographic transition in the 
coming decades, the decline in domestic saving rates will not occur simultaneously in the 
economies of developing Asia but will rather be spread out over close to a half-century, 
with the decline in domestic saving rates in some economies being offset by the increase in 
domestic saving rates in other economies until at least 2030. 
 
In particular, economies in which population aging is expected to occur the soonest (such 
as Hong Kong, China; Korea; Singapore; Thailand; and Taipei,China) are projected to 
show the earliest declines in domestic saving rates, economies in which population aging  
 
 
2001-07 2011-20 2021-30
Fitted Projected Projected
PRC 31.82 30.30 31.88
Hong Kong, China 29.75 24.33 20.02
Indonesia 24.08 21.59 20.80
India 14.54 14.92 15.91
Korea, Rep. of 42.02 35.53 37.36
Malaysia 44.65 43.74 41.97
Pakistan 6.66 7.01 10.05
Philippines 14.90 12.91 11.81
Singapore 58.74 47.02 40.43
Thailand 31.31 28.59 23.53
Taipei,China 25.10 20.68 15.65
Viet Nam 16.76 19.19 15.44
Developing Asia 27.38 26.33 27.21
Table 3: Future Trends in Real Domestic Saving Rates in Developing Asia
Notes: Authors' calculation.  Refer to the main text for explanation.
Economy
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Economy
The Period during which the
Population Aged 65 and
Older Reaches 14 Percent
the Total Population
PRC 2020-25
Hong Kong, China 2010-15
Indonesia 2040-45
India 2050-55
Korea, Rep. of 2015-20
Malaysia 2040-45
Pakistan After 2055
Philippines 2050-55
Singapore 2015-20
Thailand 2020-25
Taipei,China 2015-20
Viet Nam 2030-35
Japan 1990-95
Table 4:  Population Aging in Developing Asia
Data source: The United Nations’ (U.N.) projections available
at http://esa.un.org/unpp, and the Statistical Yearbook for
Taipei, China, available at
http://www.cepd.gov.tw/encontent/m1.aspx?sNo=0000063.  
 
is expected to occur neither early nor late are projected to either show declines in domestic 
saving rates right from the start (as in the case of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the 
Philippines) or to show an increase in domestic saving rates early on, followed by a decline 
(as in the case of Viet Nam); and economies in which population aging is expected to occur 
the latest (such as India and Pakistan) are projected to show an increase in domestic 
saving rates at least until 2030.  The primary exception is the PRC, where the domestic 
saving rate is projected to remain roughly constant for the next two decades (for the 
reason we will discuss shortly).  
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The projected decline in domestic saving rates from the 2000s until the 2020s in the 
rapidly aging economies ranges from 5.4 percentage points (Korea) to 12.5 percentage 
points (Singapore), which is about the same or larger than what other already aging 
economies such as Japan have experienced over the last 20 years.  In Japan, the domestic 
saving rate declined from its peak of 39% in the late 1980s to 33% in the early 2000s, 
during which time the aged dependency ratio rose from 16% to 29%.  The more 
pronounced decline in developing Asia’s domestic saving rate might be due to the fact that 
aging is expected to progress more rapidly.   
 
Finally, we calculate the historical and projected domestic saving rates of developing Asia 
as a whole by weighting the domestic saving rates for each economy by its real GDP (see 
Table 3).  According to the fixed effects model, the domestic saving rate in developing Asia 
as a whole is projected to remain roughly constant for the next two decades—averaging 
26.3% during the 2011-2020 period and 27.2% during the 2021-2030 period, compared to 
an actual value of 29.4% and a fitted value of 27.4% during the 2001-2007 period.   
 
The population of emerging Asia is projected to age rapidly over the next 20 years, with 
the aged dependency ratio expected to climb from 11 percent in 2001-2007 to 19 percent in 
2021-2030.  However, the domestic saving rate of developing Asia as a whole is expected 
to remain high despite the rapid aging of the population because of differences among 
economies in the timing of population aging and because the negative impact of population 
aging on the domestic saving rate will be largely offset by the positive impact of higher 
income (per capita GDP) levels on the domestic saving rate.1 
                                                  
1 Projections based on the random effects model indicate that the domestic saving rate in 
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To corroborate this contention, we analyze the determinants of future trends in domestic 
saving rates with the help of Table 5, which shows the contribution of each factor to the 
change in the domestic saving rate of each country from the 2001-2007 period to the 
2011-2010 period and from the 2011-2010 period to the 2021-2030 period.  These 
contributions were calculated by multiplying the estimated coefficients of each factor from 
the country fixed effects model with lags (model 7 in Table 2) by the projected change in 
the factor in question during the period in question.  Note, however, that in the case of 
(per capita) GDP and CREDIT, the contribution shown represents the sum of the 
contribution of the variable itself and that of the square of the variable. 
 
As can be seen from this table, the change (increase) in AGE will lower the domestic 
saving rate in every country in both time periods, the change (decrease) in DEP will raise 
the domestic saving rate in 21 out of 24 cases, the change (increase) in GDP will increase 
the domestic saving rate in every country in both time periods, and the change (increase) 
in CREDIT will increase the domestic saving rate in 15 out of 24 cases.  Note, however, 
that the contributions of DEP and CREDIT are not precisely estimated because they are 
calculated based on statistically insignificant coefficients and that their contributions are 
very small (in absolute magnitude) in any case. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
developing Asia as a whole will decline from 29.2% in 2001-07 to 26.6% in 2011-2020 and 
further to 23.5% in 2021-2030, contrary to the projections based on the country fixed effects 
model.  However, as discussed earlier, the absolute magnitude of the coefficient of the aged 
dependency ratio seems unreasonably large in the estimation results based on the random 
effects model, and this is what is causing the domestic saving rate to show such a sharp decline.  
Thus, the projections based on the fixed effects model appear to be more credible than the 
results based on the random effects model. 
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Country Time Period AGE DEP GDP CREDIT Total
PRC 2011-2020 -5.83 0.11 4.31 -0.12 -1.52
PRC 2021-2030 -8.80 0.02 10.36 0.00 1.58
Hong Kong, China 2011-2020 -8.63 0.09 2.53 0.58 -5.43
Hong Kong, China 2021-2030 -9.61 -0.05 5.36 0.00 -4.30
Indonesia 2011-2020 -2.69 0.17 0.91 -0.89 -2.49
Indonesia 2021-2030 -5.26 0.10 3.26 1.11 -0.79
India 2011-2020 -2.02 0.23 1.66 0.51 0.38
India 2021-2030 -3.59 0.13 3.99 0.46 0.98
Korea 2011-2020 -9.76 0.15 2.94 0.18 -6.49
Korea 2021-2030 -4.40 -0.01 6.38 -0.14 1.84
Malaysia 2011-2020 -3.96 0.20 2.32 0.53 -0.91
Malaysia 2021-2030 -6.08 0.11 4.49 -0.30 -1.77
Pakistan 2011-2020 -0.92 0.23 0.97 0.06 0.35
Pakistan 2021-2030 -1.63 0.16 3.58 0.92 3.04
Philippines 2011-2020 -2.51 0.22 0.88 -0.58 -2.00
Philippines 2021-2030 -3.58 0.12 1.86 0.51 -1.09
Singapore 2011-2020 -14.06 0.20 2.16 -0.02 -11.72
Singapore 2021-2030 -10.70 -0.06 4.33 -0.16 -6.59
Thailand 2011-2020 -5.23 0.08 1.54 0.89 -2.72
Thailand 2021-2030 -9.59 0.02 4.53 -0.02 -5.06
Taipei,China 2011-2020 -6.44 0.16 2.73 -0.86 -4.42
Taipei,China 2021-2030 -9.16 0.01 4.13 0.00 -5.02
Viet Nam 2011-2020 -0.99 0.28 1.93 1.21 2.43
Viet Nam 2021-2030 -8.04 0.04 4.25 0.00 -3.74
Table 5: The Contribution of Each Factor to Future Trends in Real Domestic Saving
Rates in Developing Asia
Note: Refer to the main text for variable definitions and a description of the calculation method. 
 
The variables making by far the largest contributions (in absolute magnitude) to future 
trends in the domestic saving rate are AGE and GDP, with AGE making the largest 
contribution (in absolute magnitude) in 18 out of 24 cases and GDP making the largest 
contribution (in absolute magnitude) in 6 out of 24 cases.  This corroborates my earlier 
contention that the downward pressure on the domestic saving rate caused by the increase 
in AGE will be largely offset by the upward pressure on the domestic saving rate caused by 
the increase in GDP.  The impact of AGE will dominate in 10 economies in 2011-2020 and 
in 8 economies in 2021-2030, causing their domestic saving rates to decrease, on balance, 
whereas the impact of GDP will dominate in 2 economies in 2011-2020, in 4 economies in 
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2021-2030, and in developing Asia as a whole, causing their domestic saving rates to 
increase, on balance. 
 
Our results shed light on why the domestic saving rate of the PRC is projected to remain 
more or less unchanged during the next two decades.  The reason is that the substantial 
downward pressure thereon caused by the rapid aging of her population will be roughly 
offset by the substantial upward pressure thereon caused by higher income (per capita 
GDP) levels. 
 
The trajectory of the domestic saving rate in developing Asia as a whole appears to be 
heavily influenced by trends in the PRC, which will account for more than 50% of regional 
GDP in the next two decades.  Thus, any developments in the PRC that affect its 
domestic saving rate (such as the worsening of its fiscal balance, increases in expenditures 
on social services and pensions, and/or changes in the speed of population aging) have 
important ramifications for future trends in saving rates in developing Asia as a whole. 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we presented data on trends over time in domestic saving rates in twelve 
economies in developing Asia during the 1966-2007 period, conducted an econometric 
analysis of the determinants of those trends, and projected trends in domestic saving rates 
in these same economies during the next twenty years (2011-2030 period) based on our 
estimation results.  We found that domestic saving rates in developing Asia have, in 
general, been high and rising but that there have been substantial differences from 
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economy to economy, that the main determinants of the domestic saving rate in developing 
Asia during the 1960-2007 period appear to have been the age structure of the population 
(especially the aged dependency ratio), income levels, and the level of financial sector 
development, and moreover, that the direction of impact of each factor has been  more or 
less as expected.  We also found that the domestic saving rate in developing Asia as a 
whole will remain roughly constant during the next two decades because the negative 
impact of population aging thereon will be roughly offset by the positive impact of higher 
income levels thereon but that there will be substantial variation from economy to 
economy, with the rapidly aging economies showing a sharp downturn in their domestic 
saving rates by 2030, because  the negative impact of population aging thereon will 
dominate the positive impact of higher income levels thereon, and the less rapidly aging 
economies showing rising domestic saving rates, at least until 2020, because the positive 
impact of higher income levels thereon will dominate the negative impact of population 
aging thereon. 
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Appendix Table 1: Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
Variable Var. name Data source Notes 
Real domestic 
saving rate 
SR Computed as 100 - kg - kc. 
Heston, et al. (2009), Penn 
World Table (PWT), version 6.3
1/ 
kg is the government share of 
real per capita GDP, and kc 
is the consumption share of 
real per capita GDP.  Both 
from PWT.  
Aged dependency 
ratio 
AGE “SP.POP.DPND.OL” from  
World Development Indicators 
(WDI) of the World Bank 2/ and
the Statistical Yearbook for 
Taipei,China 3/ 
Ratio of the population aged 
65 or older to the population 
aged 15-64 
Youth dependency 
ratio 
DEP “SP.POP.DPND.YG” from WDI
and the Statistical Yearbook for
Taipei,China 
Ratio of the population aged 
0-14 to the population aged 
15-64 
Real per capita 
GDP 
LNGDP “rgdpch” from Penn World 
Table, version 6.3 
Real per capita GDP (2005 
constant prices: Laspeyres) 
Real per capita 
GDP growth rate 
CHGDP “grgdpch” from Penn World 
Table, version 6.3 
Growth rate of real per capita
GDP (chain series) (rgdpch)  
Private credit from 
deposit money 
banks and other 
financial  
institutions (% of 
GDP) 
CREDIT “pcrdbofgdp” from Beck and 
Demirguc-Kunt (2009) and line
32D from International 
Financial Statistics (IFS) of the
International Monetary Fund 
for the PRC 
 
Nominal interest 
rate 
INT IFS, and www.cbc.gov.tw 
(Taipei,China's central bank’s 
website) for Taipei,China. 8/ 
Used data on the deposit rate
(line 60L of IFS) except for 
India, Pakistan, and the 
Republic of Korea, for which 
we used the discount rate 
(line 60 of IFS) 
Inflation rate INFL “NY.GDP.DEFL.KD.ZG” from 
WDI 
Used the rate of change of the 
GDP deflator 
Real interest rate RINT IFS, WDI, and www.cbc.gov.tw Computed as ln ((1+INT/100)/ 
(1+INFL/100))  
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Appendix Table 1 (continued) 
Notes: 
1/ Available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php 
2/ Available at http://devdata.worldbank.org/dataonline/ 
3/ Available at http://www.cepd.gov.tw/encontent/m1.aspx?sNo=0000063 
4/ Available at http://www.dbm.gov.ph/index.php?id=32&pid=9 
5/ Available at http://www.adb.org/Statistics/ki.asp  
6/ Available at http://www.bot.or.th 
7/ Available at http://www.bnm.gov.my 
8/ Available at http://www.cbc.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=30010&CtNode=517&mp=2 
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Variable No. of Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
SR 78 25.2 14 -3.8 60.2
AGE 78 7.8 2.2 5.7 16.3
DEP 78 56.8 18.6 20.3 87.6
LNGDP 78 8.5 0.9 6.7 10.5
CREDIT 78 0.7 0.5 0.1 2.2
CHGDP 78 4.6 2.8 -2.7 12.3
RINT 70 1.1 3 -7.5 8.7
Appendix Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Note: Refer to Appendix Table 1 for variable definitions and data sources.   
 
 
